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Abstract
We investigate the introduction of a minimum quality standard
(MQS) in a vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly with an environmental
externality. We establish that the MQS bites only if the hedonic com-
ponent of consumer preferences is suﬃciently strong. Then, we illus-
trate an underlying tradeoﬀ between the beneficial eﬀects of quality
enhancement on prices and the associated undesirable increase in the
environmental externality.
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1 Introduction
So far, the relatively small literature on minimum quality standards (MQSs)
in vertically diﬀerentiated industries has focussed on use of MQS regulation
to correct the downward distortion of product quality due to market power
(see Ronnen, 1991; Crampes and Hollander, 1995; Ecchia and Lambertini,
1997, inter alia). Few eﬀorts have been carried out to investigate the optimal
design of an MQS and its consequences in markets where production entails
a negative environmental externality. In this vein, Arora and Gangopadhyay
(1995), Lutz et al. (2000) and Andre´ et al. (2009) investigate the role of
MQS in models where quality has a definite environmental impact. The same
feature can be found also in Lombardini-Riipinen (2005), where regulation is
carried out via taxation on polluting emissions.
What we do in this note is instead to assess MQS regulation in a duopoly
model where quality is a purely hedonic variable, consumers are myopic and
pollution is proportional to the industry output. Accordingly, quality aﬀects
the externality only indirectly, via the interplay with equilibrium prices and
outputs, but has no intrinsic ‘green’ features. This can be the case in indus-
tries like consumer electronics, where standards are directed, e.g., to improve
the quality of LCDs for computers and TV sets without accounting for the
environmental implications of large scale production.
Our results can be summarised as follows. To begin with, the MQS
bites only if the hedonic component of consumer preferences is high enough
compared to the marginal environmental damage associated with production.
In such a case, the adoption of a binding MQS that diminishes product
diﬀerentiation and increases industry output poses a tradeoﬀ between the
price eﬀect and the external eﬀect, as consumers are able to purchase larger
quantities at a lower price and enjoy a higher average quality, but this goes
along with a higher amount of pollution. Hence, a binding MQS improves
welfare not by shrinking the environmental damage, but simply by increasing
the average quality supplied to the market.
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2 The model
We consider a duopoly market for vertically diﬀerentiated products supplied
by single-product firms. The demand side is modelled a` la Mussa and Rosen
(1978). There is a continuum of consumers whose types are identified by θ,
uniformly distributed with density equal to one in the interval [0,Θ]. Param-
eter θ represents the consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for quality. Each
consumer is assumed to buy at most one unit of the vertically diﬀerentiated
good in order to maximise the following surplus function:
U = θqi − pi, (1)
where qi ∈ [0, Q] indicates the quality of the product and pi is the market
price at which that variety is supplied by firm i = H,L, with qH ≥ qL.
Therefore, the consumer who is indiﬀerent between qH and qL is identified
by the level of marginal willingness to pay bθ that solves
bθqH − pH = bθqL − pL, (2)
and therefore bθ = (pH − pL) / (qH − qL). Thus, market demand for the high-
quality good is xH = Θ − bθ. We assume partial market coverage, so that
there is another consumer, identified by eθ, who is indiﬀerent between buying
qL or not buying at all: eθqL − pL = 0, (3)
whereby eθ = pL/qL and the demand for the inferior variety is bθ−eθ. Accord-
ingly, we can define consumer surplus as follows:
CS =
Z bθ
eθ (kqL − pL)dk+
Z Θ
bθ (zqH − pH)dz. (4)
On the supply side, for the sake of simplicity, we normalise their produc-
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tion costs to zero, so that profit functions are πH = pHxH and πL = pLxL.1
Production goes along with a negative environmental externality s =
b(xH + xL), with b > 0. Note that the good has the same environmental
impact irrespective of its quality. Also, note that consumers are assumed
to be myopic, in the sense that (1) does not account for the presence of
pollution.2 Social welfare is determined by the sum of profits and consumer
surplus, minus the environmental externality:
W = CS + πH + πL − s. (5)
Competition takes place in two stages. In the first, firms choose quali-
ties and in the second they compete in prices. The solution concept is the
subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction.
3 Results
To begin with, we characterise optimal prices for any given quality pair.
These are the same as in Choi and Shin (1992):
pNH =
2mqH(qH − qL)
4qH − qL
; pNL =
mqL(qH − qL)
4qH − qL
(6)
where superscript N stands for Nash equilibrium.
As a preliminary result, note that, given the equilibrium prices, the in-
troduction of an MQS may have ambiguous eﬀects. Indeed, by substituting
1Quality can be thought of as the result of R&D eﬀorts previously carried out by firms
and summarised in a fixed cost ε > 0 that is taken to be small enough for profits to be
positive throughout.
2It is worth noting that this is not a crucial assumption, as admitting the possibility for
consumers to be environmentally concerned, with U = θqi − pi − s would not modify the
expressions of bθ and eθ resulting from bθqH − pH − s = bθqL− pL− s and eθqL− pL− s = −s,
respectively.
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the equilibrium prices in s, we obtain:
s =
3bmqL
4qH − qL
. (7)
Diﬀerentiation with respect to qL yields
∂s
∂qL
=
3bmqH
(4qH − qL)2
> 0. (8)
As a consequence, an increase in qL, like that generated by an MQS, brings
about an increase in pollution parallel to an increase in industry output, as
∂s/∂qL ∝ ∂ (xH + xL) /∂qL. This implies:
Lemma 1 There exists a tradeoﬀ between the price eﬀect and the external
eﬀect of MQS regulation, whereby a priori expanding output has ambiguous
consequences.
We can move on to the first stage of the unregulated game, where the
first order condition (FOC) ∂πL/∂qL = 0 yields the best reply q∗L = 4qH/7,
while ∂πH/∂qH > 0 always, so that qNH = Q and q
N
L = 4Q/7 at the un-
regulated subgame perfect equilibrium, as we know from Choi and Shin
(1992). Individual firms’ outputs are xNH = 7Θ/12 and x
N
L = 7Θ/24. The
corresponding consumer surplus is CSN = 7Θ2Q/24,while profits amount
to πNH = 7Θ
2Q/48 and πNL = Θ
2Q/48. Pollution and social welfare are
sN = 7bΘ/8 and WN = Θ(11ΘQ − 21b)/24, respectively, with WN > 0 for
all ΘQ > 21b/11. This establishes that the hedonic eﬀect driving consumer
surplus must outweigh the external eﬀect.
In the regulated case, the government introduces an MQS aﬀecting di-
rectly the behaviour of firm L. We reconstruct the introduction of the MQS
via simultaneous play between firm H and the regulator at the first stage.
Firm H’s FOC remains unchanged, while the regulator solves:
∂W
∂qL
=
ΘQ(ΘQ(20Q− 17qL)− 6b(4Q− qL)
2(4Q− qL)3
= 0, (9)
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which is always positive if b = 0, i.e., in the limit case where pollution is
absent altogether. From (9) we obtain:
qMQSL =
4Q(5ΘQ− 6b)
17ΘQ− 6b ∈ (0, Q)∀ΘQ ∈
µ
6b
5
, 6b
¶
. (10)
Note that (10) entails that vertical diﬀerentiation disappears through the
adoption of the MQS whenever the weight of pollution is low enough, i.e.,
for all b ∈ [0,ΘQ/6]. Moreover, from (10) one gets:
∂qMQSL
∂Θ
=
288ΘQ2
(17ΘQ− 6b)2
= −∂q
MQS
L
∂b
. (11)
Accordingly, we may state:
Lemma 2 The MQS decreases in b and increases in Θ for all ΘQ ∈ (6b/5, 6b) .
For all ΘQ ≥ 6b, the MQS is constant at Q.
The intuitive reason is that, since the MQS expands industry output,
qMQSL reacts positively to an increase in market aﬄuency and negatively to
an increase in the weight of the external eﬀect. This applies if the hedonic
dimension of the market is outweighted by the external eﬀect. Otherwise,
the design of the MQS is driven solely by the hedonic dimension, leading the
industry towards the replication of the perfectly competitive outcome. In the
remainder, we focus on the parameter range wherein some degree of product
diﬀerentiation exists.
At the regulated equilibrium, consumer surplus is:
CSMQS =
(7ΘQ− 6b)(17ΘQ− 6b)
192Q
, (12)
while the profits amount to:
πMQSH =
(ΘQ− 6b)(17ΘQ− 6b)
192Q
;πMQSL =
(ΘQ− 6b)(5ΘQ− 6b)
192Q
, (13)
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both positive for ΘQ ∈ (6b/5, 6b). Pollution is:
sMQS =
b(17ΘQ− 6b)
16Q
, (14)
and thus social welfare is:
WMQS =
36b2 − 204bΘQ+ 97Θ2Q
192Q
> 0∀ΘQ >
6
¡
17 + 8
√
3
¢
97
' 1.908b.
(15)
Now observe that the MQS may not be binding, since
4Q(5ΘQ− 6b)
17ΘQ− 6b >
4Q
7
iﬀ ΘQ > 2b, (16)
that is, for all ΘQ ∈ (21b/11, 2b) the MQS is indeed a maximum quality
standard.
Provided ΘQ > 2b (so that qMQSL bites), it is also easy to verify that
xMQSi > x
N
i , i = H,L, and therefore total industry output indeed increases
after the adoption of a binding MQS, because the latter brings about tougher
price competition which translates into a demand increase for both varieties.
Exactly the opposite applies for ΘQ ∈ (21b/11, 2b) .
It turns out that social welfare fully reflects this ambiguity:
Proposition 1 Take ΘQ ∈ (2b, 6b) , so that some degree of vertical dif-
ferentiation survives the introduction of a binding MQS. In such a range,
WMQS > WN because the increase in consumer surplus outweighs the de-
crease in profits and the increase in pollution.
Proof. For all ΘQ ∈ (2b, 6b) ,
πMQSH + π
MQS
L − πNH + πNL ≡ ∆Π =
(ΘQ− 2b) (2b− 3ΘQ)
Q
< 0 (17)
CSMQS − CSN ≡ ∆CS = 3 (ΘQ− 2b) (7ΘQ− 2b)
64Q
> 0 (18)
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SMQS − SN ≡ ∆S = 3b (ΘQ− 2b)
16Q
> 0. (19)
As a consequence, the fact that in the same range WMQS > WN , or equiva-
lently
∆Π+∆CS −∆S > 0, (20)
is entirely due to the price eﬀect enhancing consumer surplus largely enough
to more than oﬀset the reduction in industry profits and the increase in the
environmental externality.
At first sight, this result may indeed look quite counterintuitive. However,
it can be spelled out in the following terms. Whenever the hedonic component
of preferences is strong enough to yield a binding MQS, the resulting welfare
increase is to be entirely imputed to the standard correction of the downward
quality distortion generated by price competition rather than to a reduction
in pollution. That is, if the market is aﬄuent enough, the satisfaction of
myopic consumers is more relevant than the increase in the external eﬀect
that necessarily goes along with it.
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